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Abstract. Critical software systems face stringent requirements in safety,
security, and reliability due to the circumstances surrounding their oper-
ation. Safety and security have progressively gained importance over the
years due to the integration of hardware with software-intensive deploy-
ments that introduce additional sources of errors. It is, then, necessary
to follow high-quality exhaustive software development processes that
besides the needed development activities to increase safety and security
also integrate techniques to increase the reliability of the software devel-
opment process itself. In practice, the use of automated techniques for the
verification of the verification process is, however, not sufficiently wide
spread. This is mainly due to the high cost of the required techniques
and to their degree of complexity when adjusting to the different norms
and regulations. This work presents an approach for comprehensive man-
agement of the verification processes; the approach allows engineers to
monitor and control the project status regarding the applicable stan-
dards. This approach has been validated through its implementation in
a tool and its application to real projects.
1 Introduction
Failure avoidance is of paramount importance in critical software systems, needed
to be considered in the first place as it has a direct impact on the safe operation.
The main reasons for system failure are described in [3]. Around 44% of the fail-
ures are caused by wrong system specifications, and a 15% are introduced during
the design and development phases. This means that over 60% of the failures can
be avoided during design and development phases. Some of the most common
errors are to start the verification process in the final phase of the project or
not to take into account the safety from the beginning. On the other hand, the
cost associated to certain bugs and reingeneering can be unacceptably high. In
general, the cost of the development activities is directly related to the required
safety level. Although this cost tends to be restrained, it can be doubled if the
development follows an approach that does not consider safety requirements.
There are a number of regulations and norms such as DO-178B [4] and DO-
278 [5] that define the set of objectives to achieve an acceptable level of safety.
In the scope of critical software projects, there is a process of continuous in-
vestigation in order to reduce costs and development time, that usually includes
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the definition of methodologies and process automation and/or optimization
techniques. The usage of adequate tools that support them is essential in order
to optimize the monitoring of the processes. Using a V- Model, the processes
or phases identified in DO-178B [4] and DO-278 [5] are planning, requirements,
design, coding and integration, integration, verification, configuration manage-
ment, quality assurance and certification/approval liaison. Some of these phases
are integral processes and must be performed through all the software life cycle.
Due to the specific requirements of the safety monitoring processes, it is usual
that the status information for all the involved processes is very complex; in-
formation is typically contained in different places, and it is responsibility of
several teams. This situation makes the status monitoring to be a difficult task
to perform, prone to causing several undesirable effects such as missing infor-
mation, or bad dimensioning of the development situation. In critical systems
developments, this may lead to unsafe situations that have to be avoided.
Current monitoring tools are, in practice, complex tool chains mostly support-
ing separate activity monitoring. Usually, the different views over the develop-
ment progress are provided by distinct tools in a non collaborative environment.
Since different critical software projects follow different norms, there are no tools
that are able to be easily customized to adapt to different norms. For instance,
embedded software installed in aircrafts (like cockpits, mission computers and
others) is usually developed under DO-178B [4] while ground equipments (like
navigation or surveillance radars) use DO-278 [5]. In both cases, most of the pro-
cesses are similar, but they are in fact different among themselves. For example,
DO-278 [5] introduces considerations about COTS software or adaptation data.
Therefore, it is needed to take into account the particular characteristics of each
norm, additional requirements introduced in each project, and possible changes
in the applicable norm.
To increase the efficiency of development in critical software systems, it is
required that norms are supported by flexible yet pragmatic and more powerful
monitoring methodologies that can be flexible to adjust to different norms. A
severe drawback of current methods and tools is that they do not fully support
the definition and use of a consistent and uniform methodology for the monitor-
ing of the verification activities for all projects, and they do not facilitate the
compliance with regulatory requirements.
This paper describes an approach to improve the current practices of moni-
toring by providing a new methodology that covers the verification management
activities in a collaborative environment to facilitate the integration with other
life cycle process, and provide the possibility of future extensions. We present an
approach that automates the process of monitoring by the integration of opti-
mization mechanisms that includes all the information regarding the compliance
statement of the applicable norm.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents an introduction and
motivation for this work. Section 2 describes the related work in what concerns
norms and practices used for monitoring. Section 3 describes the proposed ap-
proach that allows cross-norm monitoring of the verification. Section 4 presents
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the implementation of the methodology in a tool and its usage and results for a
real-world critical software project. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background and related work
2.1 Standards and engineering processes
There are several standards that define processes for the software development
of critical systems. Most of these standards were initially guidelines describing
an approach to the regulatory requirements; they have later become de facto reg-
ulations due to their widespread adoption. Some of these standards are defined
in Table 1.
On the other hand, there are a lot well-known models that define the software
development process. Classical approaches include Waterfall development or the
V-model, that offer a complete life-cycle approach with several phases.
The Waterfall model was introduced by Winston W. Royce in 1970 ( [17]),
although the term ”waterfall” was used for the first time by Bell and Thayer in
1976 [18]. This model defines the software development phases and the sequence
among them. The end of a phase is checked through a revision that determines
if the project can start the following phase or not. There is much emphasis
on documentation to provide an adequate basis to further phases, improve the
design and aid the accuracy of the information exchanged in the development.
The V-model can be considered an extension of the Waterfall model. It is
not a sequence of phases moving in a linear way, but the representation of its
process forms a ”V”. On its left side, the development phases are represented.
On the right side, the verification phases can be found. The vertex of the ”V” is
the coding phase. Criticisms to it are the lack of flexibility or ineffective testing
methodology applied and difficult to be strictly applied for non-trivial projects.
For example, requirements are not always clearly defined by the customer, and
the development cannot wait to the clarification of all of them because of sched-
ule constraints. In projects with dynamic, non-deterministic and continuously
changing requirements it is difficult to establish accurate plans in the early
stages, often leading to a waste of resources and a lot of rework due to this
uncertainty. The Agile methods (Agile Manifesto [19]) appears like an adaptive,
iterative and evolutionary development methodology. There are several agile
software methods and process frameworks, like Scrum [20], Kanban [21], Ex-
treme Programming (XP) [22], and Adaptive Software Development (ASD) [23],
among others.
Other approaches try to balance the previous methodologies, to take advan-
tage of their strenghts and compensate for their weaknesses, as described by
Boehm and Turner in [24] and [26]. They support the idea of Brooks in his
article [25], that building software is always hard and there is not a silver bul-
let because of its inherent properties: complexity, conformity, changeability and
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Table 1. Selected related standards
Doc. No. Title Description
ESARR6 Eurocontrol Safety Reg-
ulatory Requirement
6 Software in ATM
Functional Systems, [7]
Applicable to ATM/CNS systems. Continua-
tion of the framework defined in [8] for the
software. Two accepted international standards
used for compliance with it are [5] and [9].
DO-178B Software Considerations
in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certifica-
tion, [4]
One of the most accepted international stan-
dards. Used as a basis for [5]. Recently up-
dated to [10], that includes additional objec-
tives and it is complemented with the supple-
ments [11], [12], [13] and [14].
DO-278 Guidelines for Commu-
nication, Navigation,
Surveillance and Air
Traffic Management, [5]
Provides guidelines for non-airborne
CNS/ATM systems. It is intended to reuse the
objectives included in DO-178B/ED-12B to
the software contained in ATM/CNS systems,
reviewing, modifying and expanding in some
cases, them. This document has also been
recently updated to [6]
IEC 61508 Functional safety of
electrical/ electronic/
programmable electronic
safety-related systems, [1]
Industry automation. It is intended to be a
safety standard applicable to all kinds of in-
dustry. Includes the complete safety life cycle.
It has been used as a basis for other specific
documents, as railway (CENELEC 50128 [15]),
automotive industries (ISO 26262 [1]) or nu-
clear power plants (IEC 61513 [2])
CENELEC
50128
Railway applications -
Communications, sig-
nalling and processing
systems, [15]
Standard applicable in the railway industry.
Specifies the processes and technical require-
ments for the development of software for pro-
grammable electronic systems for use in railway
control and protection applications
ISO 26262 Road Vehicles - Func-
tional Safety
Referred to the safety application in the auto-
motive industry. Its objective is to assure the
functional safety of a electric/electronic system
of a motor vehicle. Developed from the [1] for
its specific use in the automotive industry.
IEC 62304 Medical device software -
Software life cycle pro-
cesses, Ref. [16]
This norm specifies the software life cycle re-
quirements in medical devices
invisibility. Boehm and Turner propose a risk-based approach to be used in soft-
ware projects to incorporate both agile and disciplined characteristics according
to the project needs.
2.2 Missing elements for a more automated verification monitoring
The selection of a concrete development model often comes imposed by the
company methodology, customer requirements or simply due to convenience.
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This is an additional handicap in order to introduce the standard requirements
in the development strategies, and it becomes extremely important to be able
to address as many development models as possible with the minimum impact
in the applicable standard.
Regardless to the methodology used, it is necessary to monitor and control
the status of the development activities, in order to check if the project objectives
are being achieved and to make correction in the process if needed.
Within the scope of this work, and in order to improve the monitoring and
control activity in software projects, the following goals are defined: (1) to cover
the verification management activities, (2) to develop a collaborative environ-
ment, (3) to facilitate the integration with other life cycle processes and (4)
to provide the possibility of future extensions and adaptation to new norms or
processes.
At this point, it is important that the monitoring and control activities are
as automated as possible, using the contributions of all actors involved in the
project. This way, each actor needing information about the status of the project
can find it almost immediately, which can contribute to reduce risks associated
to the development.
Verification processes are typically achieved by the usage of non standardized
tool chains combined with ad-hoc methods, practices and tools that constitute a
competition between companies. These are typically set at the start of a project
and have to be latter heavily modified if any change is produced or a different
project is started. Therefore, it is not easy to obtain information about these
and it is even more difficult to get hands on specific technology.
It is necessary to look for new solutions and mechanisms that contribute to
reach the development objectives in a more effective way, increasing the reliabil-
ity and safety required, reducing at the same time the risk and costs associated
to the software development. Up to the best of our knowledge, there is no pub-
licly available methodology (also supported by a tool) that provides a unifying
framework for the monitoring activities, i.e., for the verification of the verifica-
tion. The presented approach overcomes this.
3 Support for improvement of the monitoring of the
verification process
This section describes the proposed approach that aims at improving and au-
tomating the monitoring of the activities involved in the verification process of
critical software systems, by meeting the objectives described above. Figure 1
provides an overview of this methodology.
Our approach relies on the initial establishment of an assurance level and
an applicable norm. The assurance level indicates the relation between a failure
condition and its associated effects in the system. Failure conditions are classified
into: catastrophic, hazardous, major, minor and no effect. Depending on the
assurance level allocated to the software, the objectives to be reached are defined.
For example, in case of DO-178B [4], level A is the most critical level and level E
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Fig. 1. General operational concept
is the lowest criticality one; whereas for DO-278 [5], AL1 is the most restrictive
one and AL6 the least restrictive one.
Derived from several years of professional engineering on monitoring of veri-
fication activities for critical software systems in a wide range of critical software
systems, our approach is based on the following concepts: the fundamental re-
quirements to be met by the methodology, and a set of operational phases.
The methodology meets overall fundamental requirements, that indicate the
important objectives to be achieved in a correct verification process. The require-
ments are precisely that: (i) the methodology has to support full collaboration
among all actors of the verification process; and (ii) the different phases of the
methodology are carried out by specific project roles such as developers, project
managers, or verifiers that have different activities to perform. As such, it de-
fines the access and permissions policy that determine the actions that every
role is able to perform. The methodology defines a minimum set of phases that
must be simple in their conception in order to guarantee its applicability across
projects. The phases determine the way in which the monitoring process it-
self takes place, defining a sequence of steps to execute in order to (1) initially
establish; and later (2) carry out the monitoring of the verification activities.
The methodology phases must allow an easy integration of different norms in
the project (or across projects) to ensure that the software complies with the
specific objectives.
3.1 Specification of the monitoring framework
This initial phase defines the baseline elements of the verification activities of the
different software projects. The methodology supports simultaneous monitoring
of different projects. For a given software project i, a number of verification
activities (V Ai) take place to ensure the correctness of the software development
with respect to a norm and an assurance level. A verification activity j of a
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project i, named V ji , is an action carried out by at least one actor; this action
consist of checking a set of predefined elements. For each project i, an Ei set must
be defined. It is true that for two different projects i and j, it is not necessary
that the set of elements of Ei and Ej is equal. As the software projects are
alive, the baseline elements are managed and can dynamically change over time
according to the identification of the specific project needs.
AVeMaCS verification monitoring 
Project ij Process ijl 
Verification Activities 
- Verification processes per project 
-  Actors and roles 
-  Monitoring processes  
-  Monitoring views 
Actors 
Project in 
Process ink 
Process ink+1 
.  .  . 
.  .  . 
Results 
& status 
Defines & sets Results & status 
Fig. 2. Specification overview in the supporting tool AVeMaCS.
Some items must be specified (all in sets) that define the operational en-
vironment of the methodology, facilitating its use and applicability to specific
projects and contexts. These items will be specified in section 3.2, as a part of
the parametrization for the approach.
One of the essential specifications concerns the actors and their role. Default
roles are: administrator, verification manager, verifier, developer, and reader. A
reader has the sole possibility of accessing the status of the development and ver-
ification processes, and it is typically the role of project managers and technical
managers. Developers have access to all information though they cannot modify
the status of any item or comment. verifiers can introduce comments and obser-
vations about any configuration item registered for a specific process changing
their status, and they can update the values of the verification processes and
the configuration items and set their status. The verification manager has all
permissions of the verification process and can update any of the elements.
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3.2 Parameterization
This phase instantiates the above framework specifications that are particular-
ized to manage the verification activities. The progress of the verification process
of a project i (progi) is related to the actual progress of the verification activ-
ities in the different processes. (V Ai): progi = f
V Ai = [Completed, Pending].
Progress of a project is monitored by defining and observing the status of the
specified set of elements E. When the verification process of project i is com-
pleted then progi = Completed; value Pending indicate that there is still some
comment (or non-conformity) that has not been addressed.
From each project i, the following variables are extracted from the framework
specifications of section 3.1:
– Norm set and standards of applicability (NSi).
– Assurance level (ALi).
– Project characteristics relative to specific management issues are:
• Life cycle (LCi) of the project. Example values (i.e., models) are pre-
sented in section 2.1.
• The selected verification processes (V Pi) to monitor the software devel-
opment correctness in its different parts. Each process has an associated
list of configuration items and process checklists that are registered for
it that reflect important information to be checked in the software de-
velopment.
– The process checklists (PCi,j) for each V Pi. If referred to a given project,
the project subindex can be eliminated.
– The list of configuration items includes:
• Set of documents (DOi) to be provided for a given project and norms
and the status of the documents. For example, requirements or design
documents.
• The process document checklist (PDCi,j) for a concrete document j of
project i assigned to a specific verification process. If referring to a given
project, it can be abbreviated eliminating the project subindex.
• Set of observations (Oi,j) and their status that are specific information
items of relevance.
– Users (USi) of project i including their roles. Examples of values for user
roles have been given in section 3.1.
Possible values for the above variables are later exemplified in a real project
example in Table 2.
3.3 Assessment of verification status
As the goal of the methodology is to assist in the assessment of the project status
that implies the compliance with the norm objectives, our approach provides
several levels of control or views:
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– Project status view reflects the status for each verification process within the
project. The project status is determined by the Consistency and Complete-
ness Check, namely C&C algorithm (see Figure 3).
– Verification process view reflects the status of the verification processes,
including the process status view, configuration items status view and the
view on the configuration items observations.
• Process status view reflects the results of the review of process objec-
tives according to a specific norm and assurance level, through a process
checklist (see Figure 4).
• Configuration items view shows a list of documents and other elements
(source code, for example) that are determined by the used software life
cycle standards, including the applicable assurance standard. It reflects
the compliance status through the configuration items checklists and the
observations view, described below (see Figure 5).
• Configuration items observations view shows the status of the observa-
tions that contains the set of comments produced by the different actors
of the verification process. Comments are referred to as non-conformities.
This view has the purpose of recording the verification review, the un-
dertaken actions and the status, in order to provide objective evidences
of the verification process of each item (see Figure 6).
Process status view 
Project status 
Process view 
status 
Configuration 
item view 
status 
Configuration 
item detailed 
view status 
C&C Check 
Fig. 3. Project status view
Each level provides information for the Consistency and Completeness check
(C&C check) logic, which is shown below in Algorithm 1.
As an example of an objective defined by a norm that must be checked by
the verification process, we may find ”low-level requirements comply with high-
level requirements”. This such objective is shown in the verification of outputs
of Software Design Process. If the verification actors detect that it is not met, a
non-conformity is opened.
The overall status of the project is determined by the partial status of each
process. In general, the process status can be either pending or completed :
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Process view 
Objectives 
(norm) 
Development 
phase 
 
Assurance 
Level 
 
Process view status 
Process 
Configuration 
items 
Fig. 4. View of the status of a given verification process
Configuration item view 
Configuration item Configuration item 
observations 
Configuration item view status 
Objectives 
(norm) 
Fig. 5. View over the status of the configuration items
Configuration item observations view 
Configuration item 
to review 
Applicable Standard 
 
No-conformities 
Objectives 
(norm) 
Fig. 6. View of the status of the configuration items’ observations
if [∀j status(V Pi,j) = Completed] then status(Pi) = Completed
else status(Pi) = Pending
A pending status is assigned when there is a negative answer to any question
of the process or configuration items checklist or there is an opened comment
for any of the configuration items.
4 Validation through a use case
The validation of the proposed approach is shown in this section firstly by pre-
senting its practical implementation in a software tool based on PhP and Java;
and secondly, by presenting a real critical software project example that has
been specified and parametrized in a software tool. We show the monitoring of
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Algorithm 1 C&C Check Algorithm
for all (V Pj) do
status(PCj)← Pending
status(PDCj)← Pending
status(Oj)← Pending
if PCj is filled then
AnswerResultsj ← GetProcessAnswerResultsj
if AnswerResultsj == OK then
status(PCj)← Completed
end if
end if
if PDCj is filled then
DocumentAnswerResultsj ← GetProcessDocumentAnswerResultsj
if DocumentAnswerResultsj == OK then
status(PDCj)← Completed
end if
end if
status(Oj)← GetDocumentCommentsResultsj
if status(Oj) == OK then
status(PDCj)← Completed
end if
if ((status(PCj) 6= Completed)||(status(PDCj) 6= Completed)||status(Oj) 6=
Completed) then
status(V Pj)← Pending
else
status(V Pj)← Completed
end if
end for
the project status through different monitoring views, finally showing the view
over the observed non-conformities.
The practical use case over the tool allows to check the methodology utility
and the management of the life cycle process of the software for a given norm.
The first step was to define a norm, the objectives, and basic checklists to
cover the whole life cycle. Once all this information is introduced in the tool, it is
possible to modify or extend it to be reused in other projects. All the processes
are customizable for the users (verification actors), allowing the definition of the
scope for each project.
The project that has been selected as an example for the tool validation is
a real defence project that consists of the replacement of the cockpit display
units of a military aircraft. To demonstrate that the software was correctly de-
signed, verified and validated, the considerations provided by [4] were used as an
acceptable means of compliance. According to the Functional Hazard Analysis
(see [27]), the assurance level to be applied is DAL-B. The development life-cycle
used was a ”V” model, and the phases defined in [4] were used. For each of these
phases, the our approach was used. For the planning process, five plans (PSAC,
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SDP, SVP, SCMP and SQAP) and three standards (requirements, desing and
coding) were developed, as required by [4].
Table 2. Project parameterization
NS DO-178B [4]
AL DAL-B
LC V-Model
V P Planning, requirements, design, coding&integration, integration, Veri-
fication of Verification
DO Defined according to [4]
PC Defined to cover [4] for each verification process
PDC Defined to cover [4] for each DO
US Defined according project organization and roles
Once the project information was specified and parametrized according to
Table 2, the monitoring process began where all actors used the supporting tool
for the monitoring of all verification activities. Checklists for each configuration
item were filled, showing their status and details. Observations about each item
were registered in the tool. Results are shown in Figure 7 where different metrics
about the non-conformities are found, separated by verification process. There
were 113 observations introduced regarding the plans and standards developed
for the project; 112 non-conformities were registered about the requirements, and
290 regarding the design; 3003 non-conformities were registered in the coding
and integration processes, related to the compliance with the coding standard.
60 incidences were found during the execution of the tests, and were registered in
the supporting tool for monitoring and representing the status of the integration.
Eventually, 28 non-conformities were detected in the verification of verification
processes. Changes needed to the procedures where detected during the life cycle,
and introduced in the tool, as part of the verification of verification process.
The main observations were focused on the need of including additional clari-
fications about some contents, like references to the development and verification
tools, and the need of their qualification. Other comments refereed to the need
of including additional information, or clarify the specified organization. In some
cases, changes were needed such as in the software configuration management
plan to address some processes required by the internal company policies. The
observations of the certification authority were also introduced, becoming part
of the information about the development process.
Regarding the development standards (requirements, design, and coding),
there were not many observations given that standards are typically well known
and applied in different projects. Still additional comments were brought due to
the particularities of each project and improvements to be introduced.
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Fig. 7. No conformities found by process
For the requirements and design processes, the requirements document was
introduced, filling the correspondent checklists and registering the observations.
The requirements document is one of the most important one as requirements
are used as the basis for (1) the design as they describe the required function-
ality; and (2) to define the tests to be performed in the corresponding phase.
Consequently, there were more than 100 of observations that involved changes
in the original document, including some clarifications introduced by the au-
thor. In the review of this document, the applicable standard (Ref. [4]) and the
requirements standard defined for the project were used.
The tool provided tangible evidences for the results of the verification process
for each development process which serves as a basic reference for generate the
Software Accomplishment Summary and System Safety Assessment. In these
documents, it is necessary to include references to all the evidences needed for
the development assurance level required. The data introduced in the tool are
able to provide an evidence to the Certification Authorities of the performed
work and compliance status.
4.1 Additional considerations critical software systems
The architecture of the software is of paramount importance in critical systems
as it directly impacts the complexity of the final development and, therefore,
its verification and testing. Critical software systems verification focuses heavily
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on temporal behavior applying real-time mechanisms ( [28–31, 39]). Other soft
real-time domains rather provide quality of service mechanisms embedded in the
software logic that accounds for mechanisms to allow dynamic execution whereas
preserving timely properties ( [32, 36–38, 40]). Verification of the properties of
distributed software also related to newer domains as cloud ( [33]), the charac-
teristics of the middleware are integrated in the model ( [34,35]). Lastly, specific
verification mechanisms are executed on-line in very specific contexts such as
cyber-physical systems ( [41,42]).
5 Conclusions
The lack of information and the complexity of the applicable norms and processes
in systems with safety requirements increases costs and difficulties to achieve
requirements compliance. This paper has presented an approach that clarifies
these processes, that is supported by a tool that facilitates the compliance with
the safety requirements and the adoption of new regulations.
Due to the introduced information for the data items for each development
phase, actors involved in the projects can know the software life cycle defined
with a quick view of the tool. This directly implies a reduction in the training
time of engineers. For each item it is possible to know the existing non confor-
mities, which enables their early detection and correction by the responsible. In
the tool, the collaboration is achieved through a web interface.
All information about the status of development and verification tasks is
immediately accessible to actors, that provides knowledge about the work per-
formed and the pending tasks. So, an estimation of the remaining activities can
be calculated, which could lead to implement corrective actions and minimize
the impact in project goals, decreasing the project risks.
The tool covers all the verification process according to the different levels.
The supporting tool has managed two standards ( [4] and [5]), covering a large
scope of safety related projects. A set of documents and checklists for each
develop phase and for document have been created, providing a basic framework
to manage this kind of projects. It is possible to add additional documents at
any time.
Finally, the methodology allows to follow any kind of development model.
Thus, the objective about integration with other life cycle processes is fulfilled
by the presented approach, including information about the development. The
supporting tool provides possibilities of future growth, by extensions that include
information about new norms or processes.
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